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Abstract Moral licensing is a cognitive bias, which enables individuals to behave
immorally without threatening their self-image of being a moral person. We inves-
tigate this phenomenon in a cross-cultural marketing context. More specifically, this
paper addresses the questions (i) how big moral licensing effects typically are and
(ii) which factors systematically influence the size of this effect. We approach these
questions by conducting a meta-analysis and a meta-regression. Based on a random
effects model, the point estimate for the generalized effect size Cohen’s d is 0.319
(SE = 0.046; N = 106). Results of a meta-regression advance theory, by showing for
the first time that both cultural background and type of comparison explain a sub-
stantial amount of the total variation of the effect size of moral licensing. Marketing
practitioners wishing to capitalize on moral licensing effects should therefore consider
cross-cultural difference, since marketing measures building on this effect may lead
to different revenues in different countries.
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1 Introduction
Moral licensing is a non-conscious effect that provides a moral boost in the self-
concept, which increases the preference for a relative immoral action by dampening
the negative self-attributions associated with such behavior (Khan and Dhar 2006).
Applied to a marketing context, moral licensing, for example, explains why the pur-
chase of a green product (a positive moral act) is likely to increase the probability of
subsequently purchasing a self-indulgent luxury good (a negative moral act). While
we do not consider luxury products as morally questionable per se, it has been shown
that consumers often experience guilt after purchasing an expensive luxury item (Dahl
et al. 2003). In a similar vein, it has been demonstrated that consumers repeatedly feel
bad after selecting an indulgent good over a necessity (Kivetz and Simonson 2002).
Moral licensing affects consumer decisions, whenever one decision incorporates a
positive moral dimension while a subsequent decision represents a comparatively neg-
ative moral dimension. Hence, the sequence in which such pairs of decisions are made
influences the outcome of the latter. Especially in an online environment, retailers can
easily control at which stage in the customer journey different product categories are
presented to consumers. Based on moral licensing theory, companies should strive
to present products with a positive moral dimension, like fair-traded or eco-friendly
products, before enabling the purchase of self-indulgent items. Both consumers’ will-
ingness to pay and purchase likelihood for a luxury product should increase after having
had the possibility to demonstrate social and/or ecological consciousness by purchas-
ing a ‘morally positive’ product. Similarly, a moral licensing effect comes into play
in the area of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The engagement of companies
in both cause-related marketing and philanthropy-oriented activities (Varadarajan and
Menon 1988) is gaining importance and consumers’ image of companies is shaped, at
least partly, by CSR activities (Szo˝cs et al. 2016). One specific manifestation of CSR
is the solicitation of donations, often in collaboration with a non-profit organization.
For example, some airlines offer their customers the possibility to donate to an NGO
during the ticket booking process in their online system. Links to donation options
can be presented either before (i.e. on the start page) or after the actual purchase and
payment for a company’s products (i.e. after the purchase has been confirmed by the
customer in the web shop). Moral licensing comes into effect through the contrast
between the self-indulgent and the morally positive decision situation.
Moral licensing is a well-established cognitive bias and has been demonstrated in
a variety of different contexts. The vast majority of existing research has focused on
investigating whether the moral licensing effect occurs in differing scenarios. How-
ever, little knowledge exists on which factors drive the size of moral licensing effects. A
recent attempt employed a meta-analytic approach (Blanken et al. 2015) to investigate
influential factors but failed to identify any external moderators. Consequently, we aim
to fill this research gap by focusing on hitherto neglected but potentially important mod-
erators of moral licensing. Most importantly, we introduce, for the first time, cultural
background as a pivotal factor for explaining variation in the strength of moral licens-
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ing. The potential impact of culture on the strength of moral licensing appears partic-
ularly relevant in that business is routinely crossing borders and cannot assume that
consumers from different cultures are always following the same behavioral patterns.
We choose meta-analysis and meta-regression as a methodological approach due
to several reasons. First, this approach allows us to draw our conclusions from a
sample size that would be unmatched with techniques relying on primary data col-
lection. Second, attempting to summarize systematically the entire literature body
on the phenomenon, we are able to offer both a valuable overview on the topic and
some well-grounded recommendations for future research directions. Third, we iden-
tified a need for the replication of an existing meta-analysis on moral licensing due to
methodological issues encountered in that study.
Taken collectively, this paper aims to contribute to the further understanding of
dynamics in human decision making by identifying factors, which systematically influ-
ence the size of moral licensing effects. In the following section, we further outline
the phenomenon of moral licensing and introduce the potentially influential moderat-
ing factors we identified. Next, we offer a detailed description of our methodological
approach and present the results of our analyses. Subsequently, we summarize the
most important findings, discuss our insights in light of existing literature and provide
both theoretical and managerial implications of our work. We conclude our paper by
outlining detailed recommendations for future research directions.
2 Theoretical background
2.1 Moral licensing effect, related cognitive biases and explanatory framework
Moral licensing has been observed in a number of different settings. Monin and Miller
(2001) were the first to systematically investigate and describe this phenomenon. They
showed that individuals who signaled their egalitarianism by disagreeing with sexist
statements were subsequently more likely to recommend a man for a traditionally
male job. They argued that disagreeing with sexist statements helped allay individuals’
concerns that their subsequent actions might be interpreted as morally questionable,
thereby licensing their discriminatory behavior. Ever since, the existence of moral
licensing effects has been demonstrated in numerous experiments that usually consist
of two tasks: First, participants are given an opportunity to gain a moral license by
displaying moral, pro-social behavior. In a second task, they have the possibility to
demonstrate moral behavior as well. Having earned a moral license in the first decision
situation, participants tend to show behavior that is more immoral in the second situa-
tion. Thus, in many cases, choices boosting one’s self-concept subsequently appear to
give a license for comparatively more self-indulgent or rather immoral choices. This
pattern has been shown in a variety of differing domains. For example, Sachdeva et al.
(2009) found that individuals who wrote self-reflective stories using a list of positive
words like caring and generous would donate less money to charity and engage in
fewer environmentally friendly actions than individuals who wrote self-critical sto-
ries using negative words like greedy and disloyal. Similarly, Khan and Dhar (2006)
found that people who imagined performing a pro-social task like donating money or
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volunteering time were subsequently more likely to choose a luxury over a utilitarian
product. In a similar vein, Mazar and Zhong (2010) investigated this phenomenon
in the context of environmental friendliness. Two groups of goods were offered to
participants: environmentally friendly goods and non-green goods. Individuals who
chose from the green product portfolio were more prone to lying or stealing money
in a subsequent task than individuals who chose among non-green products. Thus,
research on moral licensing suggests that moral actions can lead individuals to relax
their moral standards and engage in less moral behavior.
Two related yet different cognitive biases are known, namely moral cleansing and
prospective moral licensing. First, moral cleansing occurs when an individual’s overall
moral self-perception has been endangered by displaying or recalling immoral behav-
ior. Consequently, the likelihood of showing moral behavior subsequently increases in
order to reestablish a moral image of one’s self (Jordan et al. 2011). Second, prospec-
tive moral licensing enables individuals to display immoral behavior in the present,
if they know that they will have the opportunity to demonstrate moral behavior in
the future. Cascio and Plant (2015), for example, showed that expressing one’s plans
to donate blood in the future increases the likelihood of stating racist attitudes in
the present. Despite being related theoretically, both aforementioned phenomena are
beyond the scope of this research. This paper purely focuses on moral licensing.
The existence of moral licensing (as well as moral cleansing and prospective moral
licensing) seems to contradict several well-established psychological theories, which
stress the importance of consistency in an individual’s behavior and thus an individ-
ual’s tendency to maintain consistency in one’s moral identity (Colby and Damon
1993). According to self-perception theory (Bem 1972), for example, individuals
form attitudes about themselves by deducting these attitudes from their own prior
behavior and this perception of one’s self ultimately influences subsequent behavior.
Hence, performing a pro-social task should foster one’s self-perception as a moral
person and should consequently encourage consistent behavior. Similarly, other well-
established psychological theories such as cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger
1957) or balance theory (Heider 1946) stress consistency in one’s own judgments
and decisions as one key element of human behavior. However, one potential expla-
nation for moral licensing considers this phenomenon as one smaller element of a
larger self-regulation framework (Sachdeva et al. 2009). Individuals establish a moral
self-image throughout their lifespan. Regardless of whether one perceives oneself as a
highly moral or less moral person, this established self-image provides a moral base-
line. Sachdeva et al. (2009) suggest that by displaying moral behavior, an individual
reinforces her/his moral self-image. Hence, the perceived degree of “being moral”
exceeds the individual-specific baseline. Therefore, showing comparatively immoral
behavior subsequently does not put the overall moral self-image under threat, and
hence leads to moral licensing.
2.2 Prior attempts to identify moderators
While the existence of the moral licensing effect is well known, the extant literature
offers only few insights on what may drive the size of moral licensing effects. In a
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recently published meta-analysis, Blanken et al. (2015) showed that the generalized
size of the moral licensing effect is Cohen’s d = 0.31, where over 50% of the variation
in effect sizes between single study outcomes is due to a systematic between-study
variance and not due to sampling errors. This relatively high amount of unexplained
variation in size calls for the identification of influential factors. Below, we provide
an overview over moderators that have been under investigation by prior research.
2.3 Type of induction
A moral license can be induced by either displaying/recalling a moral action or by
displaying/recalling a moral trait. Theoretically, moral actions can be seen as one step
towards the overall goal of being a moral person, whereas moral traits can be seen as
one integral part of one’s moral self-identity (Conway and Peetz 2012). By recalling
or displaying moral actions, the goal of being a moral person is further accomplished
and therefore a subsequent immoral behavior is more likely to occur. By recalling or
stating moral traits, acting consistently with one’s moral self-image becomes more
important and hence immoral behavior in a subsequent choice is less likely to occur.
An example for inducing a moral license via a moral action is to ask participants
about donating money to charity (e.g. Khan and Dhar 2006), whereas an example for
a license induction via moral traits is to ask participants to write self-reflective stories
about themselves using positive words such as generous or caring (e.g. Sachdeva et al.
2009).
2.4 Type of behavior
Measured behavior in the second task can be either actual or hypothetical behavior. For
example, in a hypothetical scenario (Effron et al. 2012) asked participants to state their
willingness to hire a white person over a black person. On the contrary, Cornelissen
et al. (2013a) measured the amount of money offered by participants in an actual
dictator game. Previous research demonstrated that individuals want to appear moral
whilst trying to avoid the costs of being moral (Batson and Thompson 2001; Dana
et al. 2007). Therefore, hypothetical versus actual decisions should result in differently
sized moral licensing effects.
2.5 Domain in which behavior is observed
Both decision situations can be either within the same or within different domains.
Monin and Miller (2001) , for example, offered participants the possibility to disagree
with obviously sexist statements and subsequently asked them to indicate whether
they would rather hire a man or a woman for a “typical” male job. In Khan and Dhar’s
(2006) experiment, participants were asked to imagine donating money or time to
charity and subsequently had the opportunity to choose between a utilitarian and a
hedonic good. Mental accounting theory (Thaler 1985) suggests that individuals are
more likely to demonstrate immoral behavior in the same domain.
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2.6 Control condition
The moral licensing condition in which participants are asked to perform or recall
a good deed can be either compared to a neutral condition, in which participants
perform or recall neutral behavior, or an immoral condition, in which participants
perform or recall a bad deed. This is important from a theoretical perspective, as the
opposite pattern of moral cleansing exists as well (e.g. Zhong and Liljenquist 2006).
One would therefore expect a bigger moral licensing effect size when comparing the
experimental group to an immoral condition as opposed to a neutral condition.
2.7 Publication status
Given the nature of this moderator, it can be used solely in a meta-analytic approach and
is not suitable for primary data. Publication status denotes whether the data included in
the analysis either was published in a journal article or was unpublished data obtained
through personal contact with researchers in this field (Cooper 2010).
In an attempt to identify moderators, which systematically influence the size of the
moral licensing effect, Blanken et al. (2015) investigated the five moderators discussed
in this section. However, they found that the publication status was the only statistically
significant predictor in a meta-regression analysis. None of the other aspects was able to
explain systematic variation in effect sizes. For a substantial part of effect size variance,
the source of variation remains unclear. Consequently, our paper aims at contributing
to the understanding of what drives the strength of moral licensing. More specifically,
we suggest four potentially influential moderating aspects: cultural background, type
of decision, type of comparison, and publication status. We explore the role of these
moderators by conducting a meta-analysis and meta-regressions.
2.8 Expected contribution
In a previous study, Blanken et al. (2015) focused on the identification of the gener-
alized effect size of moral licensing, but were unable to identify any study-specific or
sample-specific factors, which moderate the strength of moral licensing. Our paper
builds on these results and now explicitly emphasizes the identification of influential
moderators. Specifically, we consider cross-cultural differences as the pivotal aspect
in our analysis. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate the moral
licensing effect in a cross-cultural context. In addition, we make a conceptual contribu-
tion by focusing purely on moral licensing, whereas Blanken et al. (2015) also included
data from primary studies investigating prospective moral licensing. Although both
concepts are related, we propose to make a distinction between them, because by defi-
nition they describe distinct phenomena. Hence, our meta-analysis on moral licensing
purely relies on data obtained through primary studies explicitly designed as moral
licensing experiments. By using meta-analysis and meta regression, we also aim to
make a methodological contribution, in that this approach enables us to draw infer-
ences from a sample size that far surpasses any individual primary data collection
effort. Furthermore, meta-analyses typically include an attempt to summarize sys-
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tematically the entire body of literature on a given phenomenon. This enables us to
offer a valuable overview on moral licensing at large and to present well-grounded
recommendations for future research directions.
2.9 Conceptualization of moderators
In the following section, we outline the potential relevance of these moderators and pro-
vide a detailed discussion of each moderator’s hypothesized impact on moral licensing
effect sizes. Given the nature of meta-analyses, we are constrained in the selection of
moderators by the information reported in primary studies. The moderators we chose
were both reported consistently across identified primary studies and show a sub-
stantial amount of variation between studies. Views on morality differ across cultures
(Pew Research Center 2014), hence we assume an impact of culture on moral licens-
ing. Building on self-gratification theory (Baumann et al. 1981), we suggest that moral
licenses have a bigger impact on self-rewarding than on society-related decisions. Due
to the phenomenon of moral cleansing (Conway and Peetz 2012), contrasting a moral
licensing group with a neutral control group should result in smaller effect sizes than
the comparison with a group whose participants performed an immoral task. Finally
and in line with prior research (Blanken et al. 2015) we expect that published studies
show a bigger effect size than unpublished studies.
2.10 Cultural background
We put a pivotal emphasize on the investigation of cross-cultural differences. Accord-
ing to the explanatory framework of self-regulation (Sachdeva et al. 2009), the strength
of the moral licensing effect is rooted in an individual’s self-concept with regard
to morality. This self-concept, in turn, is based on the understanding of morality
derived from an individual’s cultural background (Ward 2014). Moral standards are
acquired through socialization processes and hence, are highly dependent on the cul-
tural environment an individual grows up in and interacts with throughout her/his
lifespan. Therefore, we consider cultural background as an important influencer of
moral licensing. Moreover, behavioral economist recently called for research on cul-
tural differences in cognitive biases (e.g. Samson 2016).
Moral licensing experiments have been conducted on a variety of diverse issues,
with diverse moral dimensions ranging from racism (e.g. Effron et al. 2009) and
sexism (e.g. Monin and Miller 2001) over selfishness (e.g. Sachdeva et al. 2009) to
environmental friendliness (e.g. Mazar and Zhong 2010). Focusing on the cultural
background, members of culturally distinct world regions differ in their views on
issues related to questions of morale (Pew Research Center 2014). More specifically,
very few Europeans rate the role of religiosity in their life as very important as com-
pared to the ascribed role of religion in other world regions such as North America
or South-East Asia. For example, only 13.1% of Germans state that religion plays an
important role in their life, whereas 40.4% of US Americans and 56.5% of Thais do
so (World Values Survey 2014). Similarly, across the globe, the perceived importance
of unselfishness as an important child quality differs. Whereas, for example, 44.3% of
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Thai and 32.7% of US American respondents agree that unselfishness is an important
trait to teach children, only 5.9% of Germans share this view (Ward 2014). Conse-
quently, we hypothesize that moral licensing effects differ in size between culturally
distinct world regions. More precisely, we assume that the effect is larger in samples
consisting of participants from countries, where questions of morale are perceived as
more central to an individual’s identity. Thus, we expect moral licensing effects to be
bigger, for example, in studies from the USA and smaller in studies from Germany.
2.11 Type of decision
In terms of the type of decision in moral licensing effect experiments, the second task,
which is used to measure the strength of the moral license gained in the first task, can
be either rather related to one’s self or rather related to society at large. An example
for a rather self-related decision task is having the possibility to cheat in an exam,
where having gained a moral license leads to an increased likelihood of cheating
(e.g. Zhong et al. 2010). An example for a rather society-related decision task is
having the possibility to donate money to charity, where experiencing moral licensing
results in a decreased average amount of money donated (e.g. Young et al. 2012).
Having performed a moral action in the first task, i.e. having gained a moral license,
leads to a boost in one’s self-concept (Khan and Dhar (2006). This affirmative boost
puts individuals in a positive mood, which in turn increases an individual’s tendency
for self-gratification seeking (Baumann et al. 1981). Arguably, pro-social behavior,
which benefits society, can be seen as self-rewarding as well. However, we consider
tasks comprising also a pro-social dimension as less self-rewarding in the sense of
self-indulgent as compared to behavior that purely benefits one’s self. Hence, we
assume a difference in effect sizes between self-related and society-related decisions.
Moral licensing should foster non-moral behavior more strongly, if the outcome of the
decision is of benefit to an individual as compared to a benefit to society.
2.12 Type of comparison
The behavior of the moral license group is compared either with a neutral control
group or with a second experimental group, which is asked to perform an immoral
task in the first place. This is important from a theoretical point of view, as the opposite
pattern can exist as well: Displaying or recalling immoral behavior can increase the
likelihood of displaying moral behavior subsequently. This phenomenon is known as
moral cleansing (Conway and Peetz 2012). Hence, we assume a difference in moral
licensing effect sizes between these two experimental designs. The effect should be
bigger when an immoral control group is used and smaller when a neutral control
condition is used. Blanken et al. (2015) investigated the influence of the comparison
between immoral and neutral conditions and could not find any significant differences.
This result is surprising and counter-intuitive from a methodological perspective, since
we would expect that differently designed control groups lead to different effect sizes.
We will have a fresh look at this issue, as our data set includes a more comprehensive
and fine-grained set of studies.
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2.13 Publication status
Finally, Blanken et al. (2015) identified a study’s publication status as potential influ-
ential factor of effect’s size. Published data obtained from journal articles tended to
show bigger effect sizes than unpublished data obtained through personal contact.
Unsurprisingly, unpublished data tends to show smaller effect sizes or no statistically
significant effect at all, which at least partly is a reason for this data not being published
(e.g. Cooper 2010). We include this aspect in our analysis for two reasons. First, in
order to validate findings from previous research and second, to use this information
as a control variable.
3 Method
We conduct a meta-analysis in order to identify the overall, generalized effect size for
moral licensing. As effect size measure, we use Cohen’s d values. Additionally, all
moderators described above are used in a meta-regression model. All calculations are
performed with the specialized software Comprehensive Meta-Analysis (2014).
3.1 Data appraisal
We identified relevant studies through online searches on ProQuest, EBSCO, and Web
of Science. The following keywords were used: moral licensing, self-licensing, moral
credentials, moral credential, moral self-licensing, credentialing, moral licenses and
moral license. When deciding whether to include a particular study, we relied on
the definition of moral licensing presented above. Purely theoretical papers were not
included. Furthermore, we excluded studies focusing on moral cleansing, i.e. showing
immoral behavior in the first task with the known opportunity to clean this immoral
behavior in a subsequent task by displaying moral behavior (Jordan et al. 2011). In
addition, we excluded studies focusing on prospective moral licensing, i.e. planning
on performing moral behavior in the future, which affects the morality of displayed
behavior in the first task (Cascio and Plant 2015; Merritt et al. 2012). Overall, we
identified 23 published journal articles, the oldest being from 2001. In these articles,
61 single study outcomes are given and used for our research. Moreover, we included
34 single study outcomes reported by Blanken et al. (2015) as well as 11 additional,
unpublished single study outcomes. Hence, we were able to analyze 106 effect sizes
in total.
3.2 Coding process
In the included studies the dependent variables measured are either a decrease in
moral behavior, such as donating less money to charity (e.g. Sachdeva et al. 2009), or
an increase in immoral behavior, such as cheating or stealing (Mazar and Zhong 2010).
For our analyses, all effect sizes were recoded accordingly so that a positive effect size
indicates a decrease in moral behavior after performing a moral task in the first place.
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For calculating the effect size, we use means, standard deviations and sample sizes of
the experimental and the control condition, respectively. When information on means
and standard deviations are not reported along with primary data, we use t-values for
the calculations. Calculations were performed with Comprehensive Meta-Analysis
(2014), following the equations for computing effect sizes described in e.g. Lipsey
and Wilson (2001) or Cooper (2010). Some studies report a comparison of the moral
license condition with both a neutral and an immoral control group. In these cases,
we always use the comparison with the neutral control group for calculating the effect
size. Table 1 depicts all coded effect sizes and moderators for each study included in
our analyses.
The three moderators labeled type of comparison, type of decision and publication
status are dummy-coded. For capturing the information of cultural background, we first
coded the country in which the respective study was conducted. In a second step, we
collapsed the countries into bigger regions, namely Western Europe, North America
and South-East Asia. We could not identify studies conducted in other world regions
besides these three. We are fully aware of the fact that using countries as source of
information for cultural background does not necessarily capture information about
the actual cultural background of individuals who participated in primary studies.
While recognizing this constraint, we also observe that employing meta-analytical
approaches with countries or groups of countries as moderators is a well-established
research strategy in cross-cultural psychology (Bond and Smith 1996; Khaleque and
Rohner 2002; Mezulis et al. 2004; Twenge and Campbell 2002; Watkins 2001). Since
primary data collection in cross-cultural research is both time consuming and cost
intensive, we consider employing a meta-analytic approach as a resource-efficient
option for identifying (first) evidence of cultural differences in a phenomenon of
interest.
3.3 Analyses
We perform a meta-analysis with the computed effect sizes applying a random effects
model. The potential influence of coded moderators is analyzed in two ways. First,
we use each dummy-coded moderator separately in a subgroup analysis. In a next
step, we run meta-regression models using all possible combinations of moderators.
In addition to using the publication status as a moderator, we also address the issue of
publication bias (e.g. Borenstein et al. 2013) by means of a fail-safe-N calculation.
4 Results
4.1 Meta-analysis
To identify the overall generalized effect size of moral licensing, we run a random
effects model. Generalized effect sizes in a random effects model assume that in
addition to sampling error, differences between single study outcomes are due to the
systematic influence of at least one additional moderator. In contrast, in a fixed effects
model the computed generalized effect size is based on the assumption that differences
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Table 1 Details of all studies included in the meta-analysis
Authors Study N d SE A B C D E
Blanken et al. (2012) 1 86 −0.08 0.22 1 0 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2012) 2 86 0.07 0.22 1 0 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2012) 3 38 0.05 0.32 1 1 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2012) 4 49 0.49 0.29 1 1 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2012) 5 47 0.03 0.29 1 1 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2012) 6 54 0.30 0.27 1 0 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2012) 7 65 0.54 0.25 1 0 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2012) 8 57 −0.11 0.27 1 1 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2012) 9 53 0.12 0.27 1 1 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2012) 10 50 0.61 0.29 1 0 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2012) 11 49 0.48 0.29 1 0 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2012) 12 48 0.63 0.30 1 0 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2012) 13 51 0.22 0.28 1 0 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2012) 14 94 0.86 0.22 1 1 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2012) 15 133 0.24 0.17 1 1 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2012) 16 65 −0.19 0.25 1 0 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2012) 17 61 0.04 0.26 1 0 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2012) 18 61 −0.34 0.26 1 1 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2012) 19 83 −0.25 0.22 1 1 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2012) 20 57 −0.67 0.27 1 1 0 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2014) 1 64 0.08 0.25 1 1 1 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2014) 2 91 0.27 0.21 1 1 1 NL EUR
Blanken et al. (2014) 3 614 −0.03 0.08 1 0 1 US NOA
Blanken et al. (2014) 4 614 −0.07 0.08 1 1 1 US NOA
Bradley-Geist et al. (2010) 1 38 −0.17 0.33 1 1 1 US NOA
Bradley-Geist et al. (2010) 2 35 0.66 0.35 1 1 1 US NOA
Bradley-Geist et al. (2010) 3 44 0.17 0.30 1 1 1 US NOA
Bradley-Geist et al. (2010) 4 42 0.47 0.31 1 1 1 US NOA
Bradley-Geist et al. (2010) 5 56 −0.70 0.28 0 1 1 US NOA
Brown et al. (2011) 1 97 0.41 0.21 1 0 1 US NOA
Cain et al. (2005) 1 43 0.58 0.31 1 0 1 US NOA
Cain et al. (2011) 1 348 −0.15 0.11 1 0 1 US NOA
Cain et al. (2011) 2 49 0.04 0.29 1 0 1 US NOA
Cain et al. (2011) 3 77 0.40 0.23 1 0 1 US NOA
Choi et al. (2014) 1 116 0.44 0.19 1 1 1 US NOA
Choi et al. (2014) 2 60 0.54 0.26 1 1 1 US NOA
Clot et al. (2013a) 1 367 0.23 0.10 1 1 0 FR EUR
Clot et al. (2013b) 1 192 0.30 0.15 1 1 1 FR EUR
Clot et al. (2014) 1 100 0.35 0.20 1 0 1 FR EUR
Conway and Peetz (2012) 1 51 0.33 0.28 0 1 1 US NOA
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Table 1 continued
Authors Study N d SE A B C D E
Conway and Peetz (2012) 2 39 0.58 0.33 0 1 1 US NOA
Conway and Peetz (2012) 3 65 0.00 0.25 0 1 1 US NOA
Conway and Peetz (2012) 4 65 0.79 0.26 0 1 1 US NOA
Cornelissen et al. (2013a) 1 48 0.59 0.29 0 0 1 DE EUR
Cornelissen et al. (2013a) 2 40 0.84 0.33 0 0 1 DE EUR
Cornelissen et al. (2013a) 3 50 0.53 0.29 0 0 1 DE EUR
Cornelissen et al. (2013b) 1 70 0.57 0.24 0 1 0 DE EUR
Cornelissen et al. (2013b) 2 92 0.36 0.21 0 1 0 DE EUR
Effron et al. (2009) 1 84 0.44 0.22 1 1 1 US NOA
Effron et al. (2009) 2 40 0.35 0.32 1 1 1 US NOA
Effron et al. (2009) 3 50 0.16 0.28 1 1 1 US NOA
Effron (2014) 1 107 0.44 0.20 1 1 1 US NOA
Effron (2014) 2 106 0.47 0.20 1 0 1 US NOA
Effron et al. (2012) 1 157 0.28 0.16 1 1 1 US NOA
Effron et al. (2012) 2 157 0.20 0.16 1 1 1 US NOA
Jordan et al. (2011) 1 51 1.15 0.30 0 1 1 US NOA
Jordan et al. (2011) 2 84 1.00 0.23 0 0 1 US NOA
Jordan et al. (2011) 3 84 1.01 0.23 0 0 1 US NOA
Khan and Dhar (2006) 1 108 0.62 0.20 1 0 1 US NOA
Khan and Dhar (2006) 2 94 0.60 0.21 1 0 1 US NOA
Khan and Dhar (2006) 3 80 0.56 0.23 1 0 1 US NOA
Khan and Dhar (2006) 4 80 0.39 0.23 1 1 1 US NOA
Khan and Dhar (2006) 5 80 0.46 0.23 1 0 1 US NOA
Khan and Dhar (2006) 6 66 0.56 0.25 1 0 1 US NOA
Kouchaki (2011) 1 64 0.58 0.26 1 1 1 US NOA
Kouchaki (2011) 2 64 0.57 0.26 1 0 1 US NOA
Kouchaki (2011) 3 96 0.52 0.21 1 1 1 US NOA
Kouchaki (2011) 4 50 0.64 0.29 1 1 1 US NOA
Leonard (2012) 1 32 −0.29 0.36 1 0 0 NA NA
Leonard (2012) 2 92 −0.04 0.21 0 0 0 NA NA
Leonard (2012) 3 43 −0.02 0.31 0 0 0 NA NA
Leonard (2012) 4 64 0.01 0.25 0 1 0 NA NA
Mann and Kawakami (2012) 1 44 0.73 0.31 0 0 1 US NOA
Mann and Kawakami (2012) 2 94 0.55 0.21 0 1 1 US NOA
Mann and Kawakami (2012) 3 30 0.86 0.38 0 0 1 US NOA
Mazar and Zhong (2010) 1 76 0.29 0.23 0 0 1 CA NOA
Mazar and Zhong (2010) 2 80 3,19 0.34 0 0 1 CA NOA
Mazar and Zhong (2010) 3 80 3,55 0.36 0 0 1 CA NOA
Meijers et al. (2014) 1 40 −0.04 0.32 1 1 0 NL EUR
Meijers et al. (2014) 2 40 0.83 0.33 1 1 0 NL EUR
123
Moral licensing: a culture-moderated meta-analysis
Table 1 continued
Authors Study N d SE A B C D E
Meijers et al. (2014) 3 88 0.60 0.22 1 1 0 NL EUR
Meijers et al. (2014) 4 88 −0.24 0.21 1 1 0 NL EUR
Monin and Miller (2001) 1 140 0.26 0.17 1 1 1 US NOA
Monin and Miller (2001) 2 110 0.71 0.20 1 1 1 US NOA
Monin and Miller (2001) 3 20 0.91 0.47 1 1 1 US NOA
Sachdeva et al. (2009) 1 29 0.60 0.38 1 0 1 US NOA
Sachdeva et al. (2009) 2 18 1.10 0.51 0 0 1 US NOA
Sachdeva et al. (2009) 3 31 0.57 0.37 1 1 1 US NOA
Schüler et al. (2012) 1 62 −0.42 0.26 1 0 0 DE EUR
Spektor (2014) 1 278 0.00 0.12 0 1 0 DE EUR
Susewind and Hoelzl (2014) 1 84 0.38 0.22 1 1 1 DE EUR
Susewind and Hoelzl (2014) 2 62 0.44 0.26 0 0 1 DE EUR
Thomas and Showers (2012) 1 76 −0.30 0.23 0 0 0 NA NA
Young et al. (2012) 1 66 −0.41 0.25 1 1 1 US NOA
Zhong et al. (2010) 1 68 0.29 0.24 1 0 1 US NOA
(Simbrunner and Schlegelmilch 2016a) 1 52 0.66 0.29 1 0 0 AT EUR
(Simbrunner and Schlegelmilch 2016a) 1 57 −0.16 0.27 1 0 0 AT EUR
(Simbrunner and Schlegelmilch 2016a) 2 57 0.26 0.27 1 0 0 AT EUR
(Simbrunner and Schlegelmilch 2016a) 3 57 0.35 0.27 1 0 0 AT EUR
(Simbrunner and Schlegelmilch 2016a) 4 57 0.58 0.27 1 0 0 AT EUR
(Simbrunner and Schlegelmilch 2016a) 5 57 0.54 0.27 1 0 0 AT EUR
(Simbrunner and Schlegelmilch 2016a) 1 111 −0.26 0.19 1 0 0 TH SEA
(Simbrunner and Schlegelmilch 2016a) 2 111 −0.49 0.19 1 0 0 TH SEA
(Simbrunner and Schlegelmilch 2016a) 3 111 −0.32 0.19 1 0 0 TH SEA
(Simbrunner and Schlegelmilch 2016a) 4 111 −0.38 0.19 1 0 0 TH SEA
(Simbrunner and Schlegelmilch 2016a) 5 111 −0.41 0.19 1 0 0 TH SEA
N number of participants in this study, d Cohen’s d effect size, SE standard error, A type of comparison:
immoral (0) versus neutral (1) control condition, B type of decision: self-related (0) versus society-related
(1) decision, C publication status: unpublished (0) versus published (1) data, D country in which study was
conducted: AT Austria, CA Canada, DE Germany, FR France, NL Netherlands, TH Thailand, USA USA,
NA no information, E world region: EUR Western Europe, NOA North America, SEA South-East Asia
between single study outcomes are only due to sampling errors (e.g. Cooper 2010).
Based on our theoretical knowledge, we choose a random effects model as the appro-
priate model for our analysis. Figure 1 depicts the forest plot of the meta-analysis. For
the random effects model, the point estimate for the generalized effect size Cohen’s d
is 0.319 (SE = 0.046; p < 0.000; N = 106) with lower and upper confidence interval
limits of 0.229 and 0.408, respectively. The point estimate is significantly different
from zero. In order to address the robustness of the result, we perform a classical
fail-safe-N (Rosenthal 1979) test. This calculation indicates the number of additional
non-significant single studies needed in order to bring the computed generalized effect
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Study name Std diff in means and 95% CI
Relative Std diff 
weight in means
Bradley-Geist, J. C., King, E. B., Skorinko, J., Hebl, M. R., & McKenna, C. (2010). E 0,89 -0,70
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). T 0,90 -0,67
Simbrunner, P., & Schlegelmilch, B. B. (2016), H 1,07 -0,49
Schueler, S., Lehnhardt, N., & Huber, M. (2012). A 0,93 -0,42
Young, L., Chakroff, A., & Tom, J. (2012). A 0,95 -0,41
Simbrunner, P., & Schlegelmilch, B. B. (2016), K 1,07 -0,41
Simbrunner, P., & Schlegelmilch, B. B. (2016), J 1,07 -0,38
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). R 0,93 -0,34
Simbrunner, P., & Schlegelmilch, B. B. (2016), I 1,07 -0,32
Thomas, J. S., & Showers, C. (2012). A 0,99 -0,30
Leonard, B. (2012). A 0,73 -0,29
Simbrunner, P., & Schlegelmilch, B. B. (2016), G 1,07 -0,26
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). S 1,01 -0,25
Meijers, M. H. C., Noordewier, M. K., Verlegh, P. W. J., & Smit, E. G. (2014). D 1,03 -0,24
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). P 0,95 -0,19
Bradley-Geist, J. C., King, E. B., Skorinko, J., Hebl, M. R., & McKenna, C. (2010). A 0,79 -0,17
Simbrunner, P., & Schlegelmilch, B. B. (2016), B 0,91 -0,16
Cain, D. M., Loewenstein, G., & Moore, D. A. (2011). A 1,24 -0,15
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). H 0,92 -0,11
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). A 1,02 -0,08
Blanken, I., van de Ven, N., Zeelenberg, M., & Meijers, M. H. (2014). D 1,27 -0,07
Leonard, B. (2012). B 1,04 -0,04
Meijers, M. H. C., Noordewier, M. K., Verlegh, P. W. J., & Smit, E. G. (2014). A 0,81 -0,04
Blanken, I., van de Ven, N., Zeelenberg, M., & Meijers, M. H. (2014). C 1,27 -0,03
Leonard, B. (2012). C 0,83 -0,02
Conway, P., & Peetz, J. (2012). C 0,95 0,00
Spektor, M. (2014). A 1,22 0,00
Leonard, B. (2012). D 0,95 0,01
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). E 0,86 0,03
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). Q 0,93 0,04
Cain, D. M., Loewenstein, G., & Moore, D. A. (2011). B 0,87 0,04
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). C 0,79 0,05
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). B 1,02 0,07
Blanken, I., van de Ven, N., Zeelenberg, M., & Meijers, M. H. (2014). A 0,95 0,08
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). I 0,89 0,12
Effron, Cameron & Monin (2009) C 0,88 0,16
Bradley-Geist, J. C., King, E. B., Skorinko, J., Hebl, M. R., & McKenna, C. (2010). C 0,84 0,17
Effron, D. A., Miller, D. T., & Monin, B. (2012). B 1,14 0,20
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). M 0,88 0,22
Clot, S., Grolleau, G., & Ibanez, L. (2013). A 1,24 0,23
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). O 1,11 0,24
Monin, B., & Miller, D. T. (2001). A 1,12 0,26
Simbrunner, P., & Schlegelmilch, B. B. (2016), C 0,91 0,26
Blanken, I., van de Ven, N., Zeelenberg, M., & Meijers, M. H. (2014). B 1,03 0,27
Effron, D. A., Miller, D. T., & Monin, B. (2012). A 1,14 0,28
Mazar, N., & Zhong, C. B. (2010). A 0,99 0,29
Zhong, C. B., Ku, G., Lount, R. B., & Murnighan, J. K. (2010). A 0,96 0,29
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). F 0,90 0,30
Clot, S., Grolleau, G., & Ibanez, L. (2013). B 1,17 0,30
Conway, P., & Peetz, J. (2012). A 0,88 0,33
Clot, S., Grolleau, G., & Ibanez, L. (2014). C 1,05 0,35
Effron, Cameron & Monin (2009) B 0,80 0,35
Simbrunner, P., & Schlegelmilch, B. B. (2016), D 0,91 0,35
Cornelissen, G., Karelaia, N., & Soyer, E. (2013) B 1,03 0,36
Susewind, M., & Hoelzl, E. (2014). A 1,01 0,38
Khan, U., & Dhar, R. (2006). D 1,00 0,39
Cain, D. M., Loewenstein, G., & Moore, D. A. (2011). C 0,99 0,40
Brown, R. P. et al. (2011). A 1,05 0,41
Choi, B., Crandall, C. S., & La, S. (2014). A 1,08 0,44
Effron, Cameron & Monin (2009) A 1,01 0,44
Effron, D. A. (2014). A 1,07 0,44
Susewind, M., & Hoelzl, E. (2014). B 0,93 0,44
Khan, U., & Dhar, R. (2006). E 1,00 0,46
Bradley-Geist, J. C., King, E. B., Skorinko, J., Hebl, M. R., & McKenna, C. (2010). D 0,82 0,47
Effron, D. A. (2014). B 1,06 0,47
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). K 0,86 0,48
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). D 0,86 0,49
Kouchaki, M. (2011). C 1,04 0,52
Cornelissen, G., Bashshur, M. R., Rode, J., & Le Menestrel, M. (2013). C 0,87 0,53
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). G 0,94 0,54
Choi, B., Crandall, C. S., & La, S. (2014). B 0,92 0,54
Simbrunner, P., & Schlegelmilch, B. B. (2016), F 0,90 0,54
Mann, N. H., & Kawakami, K. (2012). B 1,03 0,55
Khan, U., & Dhar, R. (2006). C 1,00 0,56
Khan, U., & Dhar, R. (2006). F 0,95 0,56
Cornelissen, G., Karelaia, N., & Soyer, E. (2013) A 0,96 0,57
Kouchaki, M. (2011). B 0,94 0,57
Sachdeva, S., Iliev, R., & Medin, D. L. (2009). C 0,71 0,57
Simbrunner, P., & Schlegelmilch, B. B. (2016), E 0,90 0,58
Cain, D. M., Loewenstein, G., & Moore, D. A. (2005). A 0,82 0,58
Conway, P., & Peetz, J. (2012). B 0,79 0,58
Kouchaki, M. (2011). A 0,94 0,58
Cornelissen, G., Bashshur, M. R., Rode, J., & Le Menestrel, M. (2013). A 0,85 0,59
Khan, U., & Dhar, R. (2006). B 1,03 0,60
Meijers, M. H. C., Noordewier, M. K., Verlegh, P. W. J., & Smit, E. G. (2014). C 1,02 0,60
Sachdeva, S., Iliev, R., & Medin, D. L. (2009). A 0,69 0,60
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). J 0,86 0,61
Khan, U., & Dhar, R. (2006). A 1,06 0,62
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). L 0,85 0,63
Kouchaki, M. (2011). D 0,86 0,64
Bradley-Geist, J. C., King, E. B., Skorinko, J., Hebl, M. R., & McKenna, C. (2010). B 0,75 0,66
Simbrunner, P., & Schlegelmilch, B. B. (2016), A rayban 0,87 0,66
Monin, B., & Miller, D. T. (2001). B 1,06 0,71
Mann, N. H., & Kawakami, K. (2012). A 0,82 0,73
Conway, P., & Peetz, J. (2012). D 0,93 0,79
Meijers, M. H. C., Noordewier, M. K., Verlegh, P. W. J., & Smit, E. G. (2014). B 0,78 0,83
Cornelissen, G., Bashshur, M. R., Rode, J., & Le Menestrel, M. (2013). B 0,78 0,84
Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2012). N 1,02 0,86
Mann, N. H., & Kawakami, K. (2012). C 0,69 0,86
Monin, B., & Miller, D. T. (2001). C 0,55 0,91
Jordan, J., Mullen, E., & Murnighan, J. K. (2011). B 0,99 1,00
Jordan, J., Mullen, E., & Murnighan, J. K. (2011). C 0,99 1,01
Sachdeva, S., Iliev, R., & Medin, D. L. (2009). B 0,50 1,10
Jordan, J., Mullen, E., & Murnighan, J. K. (2011). A 0,84 1,15
Mazar, N., & Zhong, C. B. (2010). B 0,77 3,19
Mazar, N., & Zhong, C. B. (2010). C 0,73 3,55
0,32
-2,00 -1,00 0,00 1,00 2,00
Fig. 1 Forest plot showing the distribution of single effect sizes ranked from smallest to largest. Note for
each study the black dot represents its Cohens’s d, the lines represent the according confidence interval.
Due to space restrictions, two studies are not displayed since they lie outside the scaled interval indicated.
Their position is indicated by arrows
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size’s p-value to a non-significant level (Borenstein et al. 2013). The fail-safe-N for our
analysis is 4531. The test of heterogeneity was significant (Q = 453.377, df(Q)=105,
p = 0.000), indicating substantial variation between single study outcomes. The I 2
value indicates that 76.84% of the variability of single effect size measures is due to
systematic between-study differences. We address the identification of sources of vari-
ation by both conducting subgroup analyses and meta-regression models employing
the moderators described above.
4.2 Subgroup analyses
In the subgroup analyses, we analyze each dummy-coded moderator separately. Table 2
depicts detailed results of the analyses. Our findings demonstrate that the licens-
ing effect differs between all three groups of cultural background (Q(2) = 61.404,
p < 0.05). North American studies show the highest generalized effect size (d =
0.511, SE = 0.074), followed by Western European studies (d = 0.236, SE = 0.050).
In South-East Asian studies, the licensing effect in general points into the opposite
direction (d = −0.370, SE = 0.087). Studies with distinct publication status display
significantly different effect sizes (Q(1) = 22.322, p < 0.05). Published stud-
ies (d = 0.492, SE = 0.064) show bigger licensing effects than unpublished ones
(d = 0.089, SE = 0.056). The type of comparison also influences the size of moral
licensing effects significantly (Q = 7.277, p < 0.05). When compared to an immoral
condition (d = 0.641, SE = 0.149) our analysis demonstrates that moral licensing
effects tend to be larger than when compared to a neutral control condition (d = 0.225,
SE = 0.040). The type of decision, i.e. self-related decisions versus society-related ones,
does not influence the size of moral licensing effects when looking at the total sample
of available studies. In addition to the analysis based on the complete dataset, we ran
Table 2 Subgroup analyses
N Cohen’s d, 95% (CI) SE Q-test of heterogeneity
Cultural background Q = 61.404∗, df(Q) = 2
South-East Asia 5 d = −0.370 (−0.54; −0.20) 0.087
Western Europe 44 d = 0.236 (0.137; 0.334) 0.050
North America 52 d = 0.511 (0.366; 0.657) 0.074
Type of decision Q = 1.584, df(Q) = 1
Self-related 54 d = 0.381 (0.228; 0.535) 0.078
Society-related 52 d = 0.265 (0.169; 0.361) 0.049
Comparison Q = 7.277∗, df(Q) = 1
Immoral 26 d = 0.641 (0.349; 0.934) 0.149
Control 80 d = 0.225 (0.147; 0.302) 0.040
Publication status Q = 22.322∗, df(Q) = 1
Unpublished 45 d = 0.089 (−0.021; 0.199) 0.056
Published 61 d = 0.492 (0.366; 0.618) 0.064
* Significant at α = 0.05
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a subgroup analysis for this specific variable using data from Western countries only.
For this additional analysis, we excluded data from South-East Asia for the following
reasons: First, how an individual perceives decisions related to one’s self or to society
is linked to the value this individual ascribes to collectivistic and/or individualistic
thinking. Collectivism and individualism are well-known cultural values (Hofstede
et al. 2010). Therefore, the cultural background of the samples included might affect
the potential influence of the variable type of decision. Second, since we could identify
comparatively fewer studies conducted in South-East Asia than studies from Western
countries, we were not able to investigate a potential interaction effect between both
variables in a statistically meaningful way. Subgroup analysis for the type of decision
based on Western samples only showed statistically significant results (Q = 3.911,
p < 0.05). Moral licensing effect is higher in self-related (d = 0.480, SE = 0.089)
than in society-related decisions (d = 0.280, SE = 0.048)
Since this factor does not influence the size of moral licensing effects in the total
sample of available studies, we exclude it from the further meta-regression analyses.
4.3 Meta-regression
We conducted four meta-regression models with the remaining three dummy-coded
moderators included in all possible combinations. Table 3 depicts all moderators’ β-
values, model test statistics and the overall explained variance metric R2 for each
model. The model test metrics investigate the Null-hypothesis that simultaneously
all coefficients except the intercept are zero. The goodness of fit metrics investigates
the Null-hypothesis that the unexplained variance of the model is zero, where τ 2 is
the variance not explained by the model. The total (i.e. explained and unexplained)
between-study-variance is τ 2 = 0.1596, and naturally is the same within all models.
All model tests are based on a total sample size of N = 101. For the meta-regression
analyses, we excluded five studies for which we were not able to identify the necessary
information in order to allocate the data to a particular category of a moderator. The
cultural background moderator consists of three categories (North America, Western
Europe and South-East Asia). To obtain β-values for this moderator, in the meta-
regression models this factor was split in two parts, each contrasting two groups.
The complete moderator’s influence (i.e. its influence across all three groups) within
models 1, 2 and 3 is Qmodel1(2) = 8.31, p = 0.016; Qmodel2(2) = 17.97, p < 0.000;
and Qmodel3(2) = 8.26; p = 0.016, respectively.
Model 1 consists of cultural background contrasting South-East Asia with Europe
(β = 0.528; SE = 0.194; z = 2.72; p = 0.006) and with North America (β = 0.676;
SE = 0.248; z = 2.72; p = 0.006), type of comparison (β = −0.406; SE = 0.111;
z = −3.66; p < 0.001) and publication status (β = 0.085; SE = 0.163; z = 0.52;
p = 0.603). The model explains 22% of variation between single study outcomes of
moral licensing effect sizes (R2 = 0.22). Model 2 contains the cultural background
contrasting South-East Asia with Europe (β = 0.544; SE = 0.192; z = 2.84; p =
0.004) and with North America (β = 0.757; SE = 0.191; z = 3.96; p < 0.001) and
type of comparison (β = −0.417; SE = 0.109; z = −3.84; p < 0.001). The model
explains 23% of variation between single studies (R2 = 0.23). Model 3 is set up of
cultural background contrasting South-East Asia with Europe (β = 0.569; SE = 0.203;
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z = 2.81; p = 0.005) and with North America (β = 0.666; SE = 0.259; z = 2.57;
p = 0.010) and publication status (β = 0.203; SE = 0.167; z = 1.22; p = 0.223). The
model explains 13% of the observed variation between single studies (R2 = 0.13).
Model 4 incorporates type of comparison (β = −0.415; SE = 0.113; z = −3.68;
p < 0.001) and publication status (β = 0.283; SE = 0.092; z = 3.07; p = 0.002).
The model explains 17% of single study variance (R2 = 0.17).
All four models are able to explain a substantial amount of moral licensing effect
sizes’ variation. However, the model of choice is model 2. First it explains the largest
portion of variance and second all coefficients are statistically significant. Interestingly,
the publications status is non-significant in two out of three models in which it is
contained. When considering publication status with other aspects simultaneously, its
ability to explain variation in moral licensing disappears. Both cultural background
and type of comparison show a significant and substantial influence on the moral
licensing effect in all models in which they are contained.
5 Discussion
In the current meta-analysis and meta-regression, we were able to identify two
factors—cultural background and type of comparison–which explain a substantial
amount of variation in the size of moral licensing effects. Both taken into considera-
tion simultaneously explain 23% of the total observed variability. Most importantly,
we were able to show, for the first time, that cultural background influences the moral
licensing effect.
We find a Cohen’s d of 0.319, 95% CI (0.229; 0.408) as an overall generalized
moral licensing effect size that is statistically different from zero. Our fail-safe-N
calculation indicates that it is both robust and substantially different from zero. The
magnitude of our computed d-value is in line with previous findings (Blanken et al.
2015), which identified a statistically non-significantly different, marginally smaller
mean effect size of 0.31.
In the following section, we provide a discussion of the findings regarding the
moderators under investigation in our study, highlight both theoretical and managerial
implications of our results and present promising future research directions in this
area.
5.1 Cultural background
Our results show that the effect of moral licensing is stronger in North America com-
pared to Western Europe. Moreover, the moral licensing effect occurs in reversed
direction in Southeast Asia. Given the shared historic roots as well as strong cultural,
political and economic bonds, North Americans and Western Europeans arguably
share a variety of beliefs and fundamental values. However, they differ greatly in some
dimensions related to morality, especially in their perceptions about which behavior
is judged as being moral or immoral (Pew Research Center 2014). Both regions differ
with regard to the meaning they give to the role of religion in their life, with North
Americans attaching a substantially greater value on religious beliefs than Western
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Europeans. Moreover, the importance of incorporating unselfishness as a key trait
in one’s personality structure is valued distinctively higher among North Americans
than Western Europeans (World Values Survey 2014). Hence “being a good person” is
more important to North American individuals than to Western Europeans. We think
that this difference in the overall ascribed importance of morale might explain the
moral licensing effect being stronger in North America. With questions of morality
being perceived far more pivotal, North Americans presumably see a fluctuation in
one’s own behavior with regard to moral dimensions as less acceptable than Western
Europeans. Vice versa, Western Europeans are more likely to allow themselves to be
immoral. Consequently, the value of a license, which enables an individual to behave
immoral, is smaller compared to the value a North American individual attributes to
this license.
Moral licensing effect is reversed in direction for South-East Asians, indicating that
they do not seem to experience moral licensing in the observed studies. Instead, dis-
playing moral behavior increases the likelihood of acting in a moral way subsequently.
Hence, for South-East Asians it seems to be more important to maintain consistency
in their behavior. This is in line with established psychological theories such as self-
perception theory (Bem 1972) or cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957), which
stress consistency in an individual’s behavior as one key element of human behav-
ior. However, this result seems to mismatch the proposed self-regulation framework
(Sachdeva et al. 2009), which serves as a theoretical explanation for moral licensing.
According to this framework, individuals establish a moral self-image throughout their
lifespan. By displaying moral behavior in a moral licensing experimental setting, they
reinforce this moral self-image. This in turn allows individuals to display immoral
behavior, since by having reinforced one’s own moral self-image; it is not put under
threat by displaying immoral behavior subsequently in this very moment. Our results
from North America and Western Europe match this explanatory pattern. Regarding
our results from South-East Asia, we think cultural theories focusing on human time
perception might offer one potential explanation to align our results with the self-
regulation framework. More specifically, we consider the concept of Time Orientation
as a suitable explanatory route. Time Orientation Theory (Bergadaa 1990) suggests
three temporal dimensions—past, present and future time orientation. These tempo-
ral dimensions influence human decision-making and judgment processes. Previous
research demonstrated the importance of time orientation in both consumer behavior
and charitable behavior (Simbrunner et al. 2017). Despite the identification of three
distinct temporal dimensions, individuals do not show solely one dimension, but rather
embrace each dimension with differing levels of emphasis. Hence, individuals differ
in the degree to which they adhere to each of these dimensions. Depending on the
dominant time orientations, an individual’s behavior is strongly influenced either by
past experiences, by current moods or by expectations towards the future (Zimbardo
and Boyd 1999). And vice versa weakly pronounced dimensions diminish the respec-
tive influence of this source of behavioral guidance. For example, a relatively weakly
developed present time orientation implies that recent events do not affect current
behavior strongly. Despite being an individual trait, time orientation is also a cultural
dimension acquired through socialization processes and hence through interaction
with a given cultural environment (Simbrunner et al. 2017). Consequently, members
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of different cultural regions show distinctly pronounced temporal dimensions (e.g.
Makri and Schlegelmilch 2017). On average South-East Asians tend to show the
weakest pronounced present time orientation compared to members of other world
regions (Rojas-Méndez et al. 2002). Thus, recent experiences and recent own behav-
ior is of less relevance as a guiding influence on subsequent behavior for South-East
Asians as compared to for example North Americans or Western Europeans. In moral
licensing experimental settings, the time span between the moral license-inducing task
and the second task in which the degree of morality is measured typically is rather
short. Since South-East Asians base their actual behavior to a lesser degree on cur-
rent circumstances than North Americans or Western Europeans do, but are relatively
stronger guided by past experiences and/or future expectations, the need for maintain-
ing consistency in one’s moral self-image looms larger. Consequently, after having
demonstrated moral behavior, they tend to show behavior that is even more moral
subsequently, which is reflected in a “negative” moral licensing effect outcome.
5.2 Type of comparison
Contradicting previous findings (Blanken et al. 2015), we find that the comparison
between either a moral licensing group and a neutral control group or a moral licensing
group and an immoral control group does substantially influences the size of the moral
licensing effect. This result is to be expected taking into account the phenomenon of
moral cleansing, which is the exact opposite of moral licensing. Displaying or recalling
immoral behavior leads to more moral behavior subsequently if compared to a neutral
control condition (e.g. Conway and Peetz 2012; Zhong and Liljenquist 2006). Given
the existence of moral cleansing, the moral licensing effect is larger when the moral
group is compared to an immoral group than when contrasted with a neutral group.
Moreover, considering that both approaches represent two distinct methodological
approaches, a resulting difference in effect sizes seems to be a logical consequence.
We included this variable mostly because—surprisingly–previous research (Blanken
et al. 2015) could not identify a systematic influence on the size of moral licensing
effects when considering this specific aspect. Having included a more fine-grained
set of primary studies in our analyses explains the additional insight we could gain
compared to previous studies on this specific issue.
5.3 Publication status
In our subgroup analysis, we find that moral licensing effect sizes differ substan-
tially when the publication status is taken into account. In line with previous findings
(Blanken et al. 2015), our results show that published data tends to provide bigger effect
sizes than unpublished data. However and interestingly, when we look at this aspect
whilst simultaneously taking into consideration the influence of both cultural back-
ground and type of comparison, the publication status’ influence disappears. Hence, the
difference in effect sizes between published and unpublished data is better explained
by the cultural environment these studies were conducted in than by whether they
are published or not. Probably, whether a data set is published or unpublished is not a
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“characteristic” per se but instead might rather be a reflection of a surprising result that
led to the consequence of these studies remaining unpublished. The question remains,
whether studies are unpublished because of unexpected results due to sampling errors,
or whether the unexpected results in fact are part of reality, which do not get published
because they contradict mainstream assumptions.
5.4 Type of decision
We investigated the type of decision, i.e. if the decision in the second task is rather
of benefit for oneself or for society, as a potential moderator, but could not identify
a systematic influence of this aspect on moral licensing effects in the total sample
of available studies. However, when looking at data from Western countries only, we
identify a systematic variation in the size of moral licensing effects with regard to this
issue. Moral behavior influences subsequent decisions that result in a self-benefit or
include a self-indulgent component more strongly than decisions that benefit society.
Our results support the assumption that experiencing a boost in one’s moral self-
concept increases the likelihood of seeking self-gratification.
When looking at this aspect by including data from South-East Asia as well, the sys-
tematic variation between these two distinct types of decision disappears. We assume
an interactional effect between the type of decision and the cultural background. How
an individual perceives decisions related to one’s self or to society, respectively, is
linked to the value this individual ascribes to collectivistic and/or individualistic think-
ing. Due to a comparatively small number of samples from non-Western countries,
we refrained from further investigating this interactional pattern.
5.5 Future research directions
We were able to detect, for the first time, two study-specific factors, which system-
atically influence the strength of moral licenses. Cultural background and type of
comparison taken into consideration simultaneously are able to explain almost a quar-
ter of observed variation in the magnitude of moral licensing effects. However, an even
bigger proportion of variability remains unexplained. Therefore, we strongly encour-
age scholars to work further on closing this gap in existing research. Based on our
findings, we consider the following as promising future research avenues.
Our study demonstrates, for the first time, that moral licensing effect is depen-
dent on the cultural background of participants. Having identified this effect between
Western European, North American and South-East Asian samples, we encourage
future research to investigate cultural differences in further cultural regions. Since
this effect is by definition connected to individuals’ understandings of morale, it ulti-
mately is related to religion. Independently from the fact whether a person considers
herself/himself as a religious person, religion undoubtedly shaped – from a histori-
cal perspective–how a society understands morale. Under this premise, we strongly
encourage a systematic investigation of the dynamics of moral licensing effect in, for
example, Muslim, Hindu or Shinto societies.
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Additionally, we use the cultural dimension of Time Orientation as theoretical
framework to explain differences in the dynamics of moral licensing effects between
culturally distinct regions. Future research should further investigate this conceptu-
alization in primary studies and potentially investigate alternative concepts of time,
such as polychromic/monochromic time perspectives etc.
Furthermore, we identified cultural differences between Europe and North America,
thereby highlighting the importance of cross-cultural research between seemingly
closely related cultural regions. Hence, we encourage future research in the area of
behavioral economics to consider specifically potential differences between these two
rather similar cultures.
We suggest a potential interaction between the cultural background on the one hand
and the type of decision, i.e. self-related or society-related, on the other hand. Based on
Hofstede et al. (2010) collectivism/individualism dichotomy, we suggest for instance
that society-related decisions yield different outcomes in rather collectivistic societies
as compared to individualistic societies.
Previous research by Blanken et al. (2015) investigated several potential moderators
as outlined above but could not identify any substantial influences. Prior research
relied on data from Western countries only. In the light of cross-cultural differences,
we strongly encourage future research to re-examine existing attempts to identify
moderating aspects on moral licensing in a cross-cultural setting.
Both our study and previous contributions of Blanken et al. (2015) explain variation
in moral licensing effects. However, we realize that all of the investigated potential
moderators are external factors, such as variations of the stimulus material used in
primary studies and/or differences in methodological approaches. We assume that
less “obvious” aspects might offer suitable explanations for the effect’s variability,
such as personality traits of participants. As suggested by our results regarding the
cultural background, general attitudes towards morality or individual time orientation
could offer further insights into underlying mechanisms of the effectiveness of moral
licensing. Thus, we would like to encourage future research to focus on the potential
impact of personality-related aspects and individual traits on moral licensing. The lack
of a systematic investigation of personality facets is a striking gap in existing literature.
Furthermore, we notice that most findings from studies on moral licensing lack a
direct applicability for managers and/or marketers. For example, most experimental
designs rely on fictitious brands; employ forced choice designs or use two tasks, which
in terms of content are rather unrelated. We understand that experimental settings are
often designed in a way that maximizes the likelihood of the occurrence of the effect
under investigation. This approach is of course highly desirable at an early stage of
research on a given effect, since the focal goal of studies often is to identify the
existence of the effect per se. However, we think that moral licensing today is a well-
established effect and research in this area has reached a stage at which it is highly
recommended to identify circumstances under which this effect can be applied in
practice. We therefore explicitly call for future research to investigate moral licensing
under settings, which are (more or less) easily transferrable into real-life marketing
and/or management measures.
Given the nature of meta-analyses, we were only able to use information provided in
primary data, both published and unpublished. Despite having exercised great care on
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data search and appraisal, we are aware that the existence of additional, non-identified
data is probable. Therefore, we encourage a repetition of our analyses with additional
data, especially from countries not included in this analysis.
5.6 Conclusion
We are able to identify aspects, which explain a substantial amount of variation in
the size of moral licensing effects. From a theoretical perspective, our research con-
tributes to the extant knowledge on the dynamics in human decision-making processes
by identifying key moderators of moral licensing. Most importantly, we demonstrate
the existence of cross-cultural differences between three distinct world regions. From
a managerial perspective, marketers wishing to capitalize on the moral licensing phe-
nomenon should carefully monitor and (if possible) plan the sequence, in which
product offerings are being presented to customers. Our findings demonstrate that
due to cross-cultural differences, marketing measures building on moral licensing
will lead to different revenues in distinct markets. Moral licensing suggests, for exam-
ple, that purchasing a green product (a positive moral act) increases the likelihood of
purchasing a luxury product (a self-indulgent act) subsequently. Based on our find-
ings, this effect is bigger in North America than in Europe. Additionally, our findings
suggest that in South-East Asia, purchasing a green product increases the likelihood of
purchasing another green product and vice versa decreases the likelihood of choosing
a self-indulgent option.
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